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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.201Abstract This note sets out some of the key internal mechanisms of corporate governance,
their institutional context and how corporate boards as a preeminent mechanism of such
governance are structured and how they perform their assigned role. Section A broadly charts
out the corporate governance landscape. Section B focuses on boards with emphasis on the
scenario in India, and Section C presents the authors’ interview with Mr. K.V. Kamath, non-
executive chairman of the boards of Infosys and ICICI Bank, two of India’s top ranking corpo-
rations.Introduction
With corporations around the world having climbed to
commanding heights in terms of their influence, power, andom, laba@iimb.ernet.in (N.
in (R. George).
ian Institute of Management
2.10.001sway over different constituents of society, governing them
in the interest of shareholders in particular and society at
large has become an onerous and daunting task. However,
corporations need to be governed in such a manner that the
competing and often conflicting interests of the state,
society, and the shareholders are reconciled and aligned.
To cater to these governance challenges, over the years,
several corporate governance mechanisms have evolved.
These are discussed in the sections that follow that (a)
briefly introduce the internal governance mechanisms, (b)
probe the issues pertaining to the boards of directors and
the Indian scenario, and (c) detail the interview with Mr.
K.V. Kamath.
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Corporate governance mechanisms are tools that principals
employ to align incentives between principals and agents
and to monitor and control agents. These mechanisms are
utilised to ensure that the agents act in a manner that is in
the best interests of their principals (Hill & Jones, 2004:
386). A firm is typically governed by a mix of internal and
external governance mechanisms. Depending on the insti-
tutional context, the relative importance and influence of
these mechanisms differ. Anglo-Saxon economies are
characterised by strong external governance mechanisms
whereas the Rhineland and Japanese governance mecha-
nisms exhibit a greater reliance on internal control devices.
Internal governance mechanisms are associated with the
use of board of directors, large shareholders and debt
holders and executive compensation schemes. External
governance mechanisms are those involving the market for
corporate control, the regulatory environment, product
market competition, external auditors, adoption of gover-
nance codes, and cross-listings in stock exchanges. In this
note, our focus is largely on the internal governance
mechanisms and these are detailed below.
Board of directors
The board acts as a fulcrum between the owners and
controllers of a corporation. They are the middlemen who
provide balance and mediate the conflicts of interest
between a small group of key managers based in corporate
headquarters and a vast group of shareholders spread all
over the world (Monks & Minow, 2010: 224). They are
elected by the shareholders of the firm and have a fidu-
ciary role in relation to fulfilling their responsibilities
towards the shareholders they represent. Boards usually
consist of a mix of inside and outside directors, often
dictated by legislative or regulatory mandates. Inside
directors or executive directors2 are those that are linked
with the company or its controlling shareholders and hold
senior positions in the firm. They possess intimate knowl-
edge about company activities, essential for the board to
perform its monitoring role. On the other hand, outside
directors, also referred to as non-executive or indepen-
dent directors, are not employees of the firm, and are
recruited for their specific expertise in areas that are
valuable to the firm.
Directors are typically entrusted with two duties, the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty (Monks & Minow, 2010:1 Substantive parts of Section A have been drawn from the PhD
dissertation of one the authors. Specifically, Chapter 2 of Corpo-
rate Governance and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Ownership
Structure, Profit Redistribution and Diversification Strategies of
Firms in India, George, R.P. CentER Dissertation Series 145 (2005),
Tilburg University, The Netherlands.
2 It is of course possible to have non-executive inside directors. In
many family owned companies, some family members are not
employees of the firm but they are insiders owing to their rela-
tionship with controlling family members.231). The American Law Institute lists (1) selection, eval-
uation, fixing the compensation of senior executives (2)
overseeing the conduct of the business (3) approving
financial objectives and corporate plans (4) approving
major changes in the strategic direction of the corpora-
tion, as board responsibilities (Monks & Minow, 2010: 233).
The board is also responsible for making sure that the
audited financial statements of the company represent
a true and fair picture of the firm’s financial position (Hill
& Jones, 2004: 386). In practice, though, as argued by
Monks and Minow (2010: 236) it is debatable whether the
average board has sufficient incentives and abilities to
perform its monitoring task.3 Pertinent issues in this
regard include “genuine” independence of directors, the
retainers paid to the directors vis a vis their net worth and
the demands made on their time. Arthur Levitt, the former
US SEC chairperson, points to as many as 22 working days
in a year whereas the National Association of Corporate
Directors in the US recommended four full forty hour
weeks of service for every board on which the directors
serve in order to perform a satisfactory job
(Balasubramanian, 2010: 145). Since most board members
have full time positions in other organisations and often
serve on multiple boards, it is implausible that they would
devote the necessary time and effort required for the
purpose.
Large shareholders
Large shareholdings mitigate the free-riding problems asso-
ciated with innumerable atomistic shareholders as they are
better able to internalise the costs associated with moni-
toring management. These shareholders are able to address
the agency problem in that they have a general interest in
profit maximisation and enough control over the assets of
the firm to have their interests respected (Shleifer & Vishny,
1986). These large shareholdings can be “managerial” or
held by outsiders. Large managerial shareholdings result in
mitigating the problems arising out of the separation
between ownership and control due to greater alignment of
interests and reduced on-the-job consumption (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976).4 However, a down side associated with
a high level of owneremanager holdings is the possibility of
entrenchment effects (Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, &
Tsukanova, 1996; Stulz, 1988) and reduced risk taking
(Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000) at high levels of
ownership, particularly in emerging economy contexts.5
For firms devoid of large managerial holdings, large
outside blockholders can be effective in monitoring and3 For a detailed exposition on the impediments associated with the
ideal functioning of the board (see Monks & Minow, 2010:
236e278).
4 Problems pertaining to the separation of ownership and control
have a long history and date back to Smith (1776) and Berle and
Means (1932a,b).
5 US studies also report instances of managerial entrenchment (see
McConnell & Servaes, 1990). Further evidence is provided in
Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay, and Larker (2002).
9 These studies include Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2000), Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000),
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), Claessens, Djankov,
Fan, and Lang (2002), Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002), Joh (2003),
Lins (2003), Lemmon and Lins (2003), Friedman, Johnson, and
Mitton (2003) and Baek, Kang, and Park (2004).
10 In addition to large shareholders, large creditors or debt holders
can also assume the role of active monitors. They have large
investments in the firms to which they lend funds and in common
with equity owners, debt holders too require adequate returns on
their investments. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state, their influ-
ence is on account of two reasons: firstly, when a firm defaults or
violates debt covenants, the debt holders receive a variety of
control rights. Secondly, the need to make ongoing cash payments
provides the firm management with more incentives to operate
efficiently to generate even more cash flow (Denis, 2001). This
ultimately leads to a reduction in the agency costs of free cash
flow. In several countries financial intermediaries such as banks are
intertwined with business group structures (the typical example
being the Japanese Keiretsu), adding to their influence on firm
governance. This phenomenon is often referred to as relationship
banking. Its beneficial effects include the reduction in information
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could have a significant bearing on their influence. For
instance, their monitoring abilities are significantly
enhanced if they are in the same industry and share
product related expertise (Allen & Phillips, 2000). Empirical
evidence on the abilities of these large shareholders to
enhance firm governance exists particularly from Germany
and Japan (Franks & Meyer, 1994; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995;
Kaplan & Minton, 1994).
Family ownership represents a substantial portion of the
equity stake in most countries and signifies a unique and
important class of large shareholders or blockholders. They
constitute nearly 18% of the outstanding equity among S&P
500 firms in the US (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), 27% in
Germany, 26% in Austria and 20% in Italy (Becht & Mayer,
2001). Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) document the
strong presence of family holdings in Asia as well.6 Family
owners assume a dual role as both owners and managers of
the firms. They tend to be among the most committed and
long-term investors in the firm, since their wealth is
intertwined closely with the firm; they are also less likely
to engage in a tradeoff with regard to foregoing superior
investment opportunities to boost current earnings.
External bodies such as creditors and suppliers engage in
dealings with incumbent family managements for a longer
period. Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz (2001)
introduce a perspective based on altruistic feelings
towards family members. According this view, altruism
creates a selfereinforcing set of incentives that motivate
family members to be considerate to each other, and
sustain and maintain the family bond. These feelings result
in reduced costs of reaching, monitoring and enforcing
agreements (Lubatkin, Lane, & Schulze, 2001).7 Similar
arguments are echoed by Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson
(1997), Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Anderson, Mansi,
and Reeb (2003) whose studies link family holdings with
enhanced performance.8 However, higher levels of family
ownership could result in risk aversion owing to the
disproportionate share of the family’s wealth being inves-
ted in the firm (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000); in a reduction
in the value of the firm (Barclay and Holderness (1989); and
biased selection of managers and directors which lead to6 Claessens et al. (2000) cover firms in Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and
Thailand in their study.
7 For a full exposition of the altruism perspective and a critique of
the Jensen and Meckling (1976) model applied to family owned and
managed firms see Lubatkin et al. (2001), Schulze et al. (2001) and
Schulze, Lubutkin, and Dino (2003).
8 Non-linear relationships have been observed with regard to the
influence of family ownership performance. Anderson and Reeb
(2003) find that performance begins to taper off at around 30%
ownership for US family firms and beyond 60% ownership levels
non-family firms tend to perform better. Furthermore, there are
differences between the performance of family managed firms
depending on whether the founding family is present in the
management or not. See Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Smith
and Amoako-Adu (1999), Perez-Gonzalez (2002) and Caselli and
Gennaioli (2003) for details.lower values relative to non-family firms (Gomez-Mejıa,
Nu~nez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001). Family controlled firms
which are linked to business group structures tend to be
plagued by expropriation concerns9 and a reduction in
performance and valuation owing to “tunnelling”.10
Executive compensation
Executive compensation focuses on two principal concerns:
the level of executive pay and the sensitivity of pay to
performance (Denis, 2001). Compensation is determined by
the base salary, bonuses, stock options, and long-term
incentive plans. The sensitivity of executive compensation
to firm performance arises through managerial ownership
and particularly the use of stock options. One of the prin-
cipal advantages of stock options lies in the potential to
align incentives of shareholders and managers and mitigateasymmetries vis a vis arms-length lending, while its harmful effects
accrue on account of misallocation of capital and the failure to
relieve borrowers’ credit constraints due to lenders’ rent extrac-
tion (Claessens & Fan, 2003). Studies on relationship banking
among Korean firms have found positive effects (Ferri, Kang, &
Kim, 2001) as well as negative effects (Bae, Kang, & Lim, 2002)
for both banks and their client firms. La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
and Zamarripa (2003) consider a similar phenomenon i.e. related
lending, wherein banks are controlled by persons or entities owning
substantial interests in non-financial firms who in turn are recipi-
ents of significant amounts of loans from the banks they control.
Common in a large number of emerging economies, related lending
results in similar benefits and costs. However, business group
structures, wherein groups exercise controls over banks, are more
prone to problems associated with the diversion of resources from
depositors and/or minority shareholders to controlling owners.
Such diversion takes the form of “looting” (La Porta et al., 2003).
Even when business groups do not have an in-house bank as is the
case in countries such as India, Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2008)
document the use of internal capital markets wherein intra-group
loans among the firms affiliated to a group serve as a channel for
transfer of financial resources between business group firms.
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corporate governance scandals, considerable attention has
been focused on the need to reign in what is seen as
excessive managerial compensation. In jurisdictions such as
the US where executive compensation is not a subject for
affirmative approval by the shareholders, boards and their
compensation committees have complete freedom in the
matter. Even the “say-on-pay” provisions,11 part of the
post-global financial meltdown reforms, are not strong
enough to curtail this freedom since they only offer a non-
binding advisory vote by the shareholders on the compen-
sation proposals put forward by the incumbent slate of
directors. Empirical evidence on the influence on say-on-
pay is now gathering pace. In the UK, where say-on-pay
regulations were introduced in 2002, the regulations
emerged as a value enhancing monitoring mechanism (Ferri
& Maber 2012). However, in most of the non-Anglo Saxon
world, ownership is not dispersed and the principal agency
problem stems more from expropriation of entrenched
insiders rather than agency problems associated with
managerial incentives.
B. Corporate boards and the Indian scenario12
Exactly two decades ago, in a pioneering contribution to
modern day corporate governance practices, Cadbury
(1992) placed the corporate board in the centre stage of
the governance system, with responsibility for setting the
company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership and
strategic guidance, objective and independent judgment,
and control over the company in the discharge of its
accountability to the shareholders. The Canadian guide-
lines (TSE 1994) around the same time charged boards with
stewardship responsibilities that covered a broad spectrum
of tasks. In India, the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee
(2000) appointed by the capital market regulator Securi-
ties and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), noted that “the
board of a company provides leadership and strategic
guidance, objective judgment independent of management
to the company and exercises control over the company,
while remaining at all times accountable to the
shareholders.”
In sum, the board’s overall responsibilities are wide
ranging and onerous, especially since non-executive direc-
tors are largely dependent upon management for flow of
relevant and timely information. In discharging these
responsibilities, how should boards be structured? The
following discussion reviews Indian experience in some
of these areas13 in the context of international best
practices.11 Dodd-Frank requires US public companies to provide share-
holders with a non-binding vote to either approve or disapprove
their executive compensation as disclosed in their proxy
statements.
12 Section B draws on an earlier work of one of the authors
(Balasubramanian, 2010).
13 More comprehensive discussions are available in
Balasubramanian (2010: 108e147).Board size
Is there a benchmark “right” size for company boards? It is
safe to conclude, as the UK Corporate Governance Code
does, they “should be of sufficient size that the require-
ments of the business can be met and that changes to the
board’s composition and that of its committees can be
managed without undue disruption, and should not be so
large as to be unwieldy” (FRC, 2010: 12). Several studies
have examined the relationships between board size, board
effectiveness, and company performance.14 Lipton and
Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), arguably among the
earliest to raise this question academically, concluded that
smaller boards (of seven or eight directors) were more
effective, while Carter and Lorsch (2004) extended these
numbers to a maximum of 10 directors. Modern day regu-
latory requirements mandating certain committees of the
board for listed companies, and the desire not to overlap
members too much on different committees, do dictate
additional board strength.
There is no legislative mandate in India on board size
except for certain minimum requirements e two in the case
of private limited companies, and three in case of public
limited companies. The Companies Bill, 2011 (awaiting
discussion and approval by parliament) has proposed
a maximum of 15 directors unless a higher number is
approved by the members through a special (super
majority) resolution.15 But the wisdom or even the
compulsions of legislating such a maximum are open to
debate. In the Indian context, with directors serving on
more than one committee, and the short duration of
meetings, smaller boards often translate into inadequate
time allocations to committee meetings. In India, empirical
data from three studies found the median size of boards
ranging from 8 to 11 (Balasubramanian, 2008;
Balasubramanian, Black, & Khanna, 2010; Garg, 2005: 63).
Balasubramanian and Anand (2012) found that as of March
2012, the median size of the National Stock Exchange’s
Nifty Index companies was 14 with just 5 companies having
boards of 10 members or fewer. This is a remarkable
escalation from the trends observed in the preceding
studies. Part of the reason appears to be the number of
directors in the non-independent non-executive category
(due possibly to the classification of nominee directors as
non-independent) with the consequential increase in the
number of independent directors to comply with the listing
requirements relating to the proportion of independent
directors on their boards.Board composition
The Cadbury Committee in the UK sought a majority of the
board to be non-executive and independent (Cadbury,
1992), a principle endorsed by successive reviews of the14 Illustratively, Conyon and Peck (1998), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and
Wells (1998), Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Bhagat and Black (1999).
15 Clause 149 (1) (a) and (b).
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recommendations are in the interest of setting and main-
taining standards, of preventing individuals or groups from
dominating the board’s decisions, and to bring in objec-
tivity and impartiality (Higgs Review, 2003; Sen, 2009: 131;
Smith, 1759: 111). The OECD Principles also recommend
a good proportion of independent non-executive directors
on company boards.16 Corporate governance guidelines
elsewhere in the developed world echo the imperatives of
independent and unbiased judgment on the part of the
board. They especially emphasise the need to insulate the
boards from executive management decisions and initia-
tives that may militate against this natural law of justice
and equity to all shareholders, whether in operational
control or not.
In India, the imperatives of an appropriate board balance
were well articulated in the Kumar Mangalam Birla
Committee Report on corporate governance. It recom-
mended that “ .not less than fifty percent of the Board
(should comprise) non-executive directors. .In case
a company has a non-executive chairman, at least one-third
of the Board should comprise of independent directors, and
in case a company has an executive chairman, at least one-
half of the Board should be independent.”17 This was
mandated on listed companies through clause 49 of the
listing agreements between the companies and the stock
exchanges their securities are listed on. With effect from
January 2006, subsequent amendments based on the Nar-
ayana Murthy Committee recommendations continue to
reiterate this requirement. Indian company legislation does
not specifically mandate non-executive directors on boards
of companies, but implies such a requirement through
provisions relating to audit committees. Two-thirds of the
members of the audit committee are required to be “other
than managing or whole-time directors”,18 which in effect
means non-executive directors. Accordingly, Indian listed
companies have over the years endeavoured to populate
their boardswith a largerproportionof independent andnon-
independent, non-executive members. As of 31st March
2011, of the 718 director positions in the aggregate on the 50
NSE Nifty companies, executives accounted for 28%, inde-
pendent non-executives 45% and non-independent non-
executives 27% (Balasubramanian & Anand, 2012). Individual
company wise, median numbers for 2011 reflect a structural
shift from 2000 (pre-clause 49 regime) numbers with the
executive component in boards coming down sharply with
the non-executives retaining their strength, in other words
tilting the board balance away from executivemanagement.
Board profile and diversity
Another dimension of the corporate board is its demo-
graphic profile. Does the board, especially its non-16 OECD (2004), sub-paragraph E 1.
17 Report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate
Governance (2000), Securities and Exchange Board of India.
18 Section 292A (1) of the Companies Act, 1956. This requirement
was introduced in 2000.executive, independent component, have the right
balance of domain skills, breadth of experience and expo-
sure, and socio-cultural variety of value to the company?
Several psychological and behavioural justifications have
been offered in support of a business case for board
diversity.19 The Upper Echelons Perspective (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984) suggests that corporate strategy and perfor-
mance reflects the values and cognitive base of top
management or the dominant coalition within the corpo-
ration. People with similar echelon characteristics and
traits empathise with each other much better than with
those with dissimilar traits. As a result, there is greater
convergence of approach to problems and their solutions
among people who share such homogenous backgrounds.
However, this can lead to a false consensus effect where
decisions may not necessarily be the best under the
circumstances. Heterogeneous groups, while undoubtedly
vulnerable to more protracted discussions and disagree-
ments, have been observed to produce more balanced
results. Overall, theoretical research postulates that
diversity in board composition is conducive not only to
improving shareholder returns but also to enhancing
stakeholder engagement and consequently, stabilising and
improving the potential for sustainable growth for the
corporation.Board chair/chief executive duality
A major theme of ongoing discussion in corporate gover-
nance literature, especially in the context of board inde-
pendence and effectiveness, concerns the Duality Debate.
Given the board’s perceived role of overseeing the execu-
tive, there is a general consensus that the two positions
should be separated (The UK Corporate Governance Code,
FRC, 2010, A.2.1). Most countries presently or formerly
under British suzerainty have recommended separation of
the board chair and chief executive positions. While some
wonder whether selecting slates of directors independent
of CEO control would create competing power centres and
dilute control,20 proponents of the duality theory would
contend that in fact that is the effect desired e counter-
vailing the power of the chief executive so that absolute
power is not concentrated in one individual.
The Indian approach to the duality issue is based upon
the British position. The pioneering industry initiative, CII’s
Desirable Corporate Governance e A Code21 bypassed this
issue. The Corporate Excellence Report22 of a government
committee recommended that “the position of Board Chair
and Managing Director of a Listed company should be
separated”, but gave the company the option to combine19 Representatively, Dallas (2002). This section draws on her main
observations and conclusions.
20 Corporate Governance, Greenspan, Allan (2002), CESifo Forum
3/2002, University of Munich.
21 Confederation of Indian Industry (1998).
22 Report of the (Government) Committee on Excellence Through
Corporate Governance (2000), Department (now, Ministry) of
Company Affairs, Government of India, www.dca.nic.in.
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the board (with all directors concurring) for taking that
decision. This approach is similar to the “comply or
explain” model adopted by the Hampel Committee in the
United Kingdom. The SEBI (Kumar Mangalam Birla) Report
on corporate governance recognised the differing roles of
the two positions and expressed itself in favour of sepa-
rating them, but stopped short of mandating this as
a requirement. In India, the CMD (chairman and managing
director) concept is firmly established. As of 31st March
2011, 39 out of 50 of the Nifty companies had separated the
positions of board chair and the chief executive, compared
to 21 in March 2006. In either case, independence in spirit
may have to be established in most of the non-executive
board chairs as many of them may be family or group
nominees. The duality issue has wider ramifications with
respect to the public sector enterprises including insurance
companies, banks, and financial institutions, where it is
virtually axiomatic to have a combined CMD, or even when
these positions are separated, to have the chairman as
a full time executive. Where there are external share-
holders besides the government, and even otherwise, the
need for independent board functioning and oversight are
even more imperative. Thus, the relevance of separation of
these positions into an independent non-executive board
chair and an executive managing director is indeed very
strong.
Lead director
Around the world, and especially in the US, efforts have
been made to find a mechanism that while accommodating
the custom, would also allow for the spirit behind the
separation movement to be brought in. Lipton and Lorsch
(1992) were among the earliest to propose that boards
appoint a lead director from among its independent
members. The lead director was to be consulted by the CMD
on several matters relating to the board and the resultant
structure, according to Lipton and Lorsch, would better
evaluate chief executive performance. Since then several
corporate governance guidelines have picked up the lead
director concept.23 A number of countries have adopted
this concept in varying degrees of refinement consistent
with their stage of development. Illustratively, in the US,
overall, 92% of boards report having appointed a lead or
presiding director.24
In India, the lead director concept has not caught on. Of
the 50 Nifty companies as of 31st March 2011, only 6 have
a lead director (Balasubramanian & Anand, 2012). This is
perhaps understandable considering the corporate owner-
ship and control structures that are predominantly skewed
towards concentrated holdings and entrenched dominance.23 Cadbury (1992), Paragraph 4.9 of the Code of Best Practice, and
Paragraph 1.2 of the Summary of Recommendations relating to the
Code of Best Practice; UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010),
A.4.1; Principle VI-E of the Principles of Corporate Governance
(OECD, 2004).
24 Spencer Stuart Board Index (2011), p. 24.Board interlocks and multiple directorships
A common feature of corporate boards is the multiplicity of
memberships that somedirectors hold, sometimes in common
with other members of the boards they sit on, and often
reciprocally. Multiple directorships would make demands on
a director’s time resources which may have implications on
the due discharge of an individual’s fiduciary responsibilities,
and the attention given by board members to companies’
affairs. However, as Dooley (1969: 315) observed of the insti-
tution of interlocking boards back in 1969, “.it is doubtful
that it would have survived without serving some material
purpose.” Director interlocks are fairly common and are
extensively used in group-affiliated firms to exercise control
and co-ordinate activities across the group (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978) and to facilitate information sharing
(Haunschild & Beckman, 1998).25 “Board size and composi-
tion,” wrote Pfeffer (1972: 226), “are not random (but).
rational organizational responses to the conditions of the
external environment.” Further, boards were vehicles
through which organisations co-opted external organisations
with which they were interdependent (Pfeffer, 1972: 222).
Mintzberg approvingly refers to the co-optation strategy of
gaining power over external organisations through the vehicle
of board seats (Mintzberg, 1983: 82, 86e88).
Overall, interlocks appear to be triggered when external
interdependencies of an organisation are substantial and
total absorption of such external entities is neither feasible
nor permitted, or even necessary. Moreover interlocks may
enhance organisational reputation through celebrity associ-
ations. In emerging markets like India, the perceived lack of
a large pool of potential directorial candidateswho can bring
the requisite wisdom and professional stature is often cited
as the reason for more experienced and incumbent directors
being sought to take up further positions on boards.
According to Berle and Means (1932a,b: 204e5) board
interlocks are generally to the advantage of the corporations
concerned and were not only acceptable but also desirable,
so long as the directors made full disclosure of their position
in situations of interest conflicts. However, such interlocks
potentially are injurious to the absentee shareholders and in
a wider sense to all stakeholders of the corporation. Besides,
they lead to monopolistic tendencies militating against
competition and other public policy interests. This was
indeed the position advocated a century ago with Louis
Brandeis, one of the earliest and most scathing of critics
(Brandeis, 1913, Chapter III) pronouncing interlocking
directorates as undemocratic and inherently bad for society,25 Eighty-six percent of billion-dollar company boards in the US
include at least one Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/Chief Operating
Officer (COO) of another firm. Sixty-five percent of outside direc-
tors serve on two or more boards, 89 percent of inside directors are
outside directors on other company’s boards and a fifth of all
directors served on four boards or more (Monks & Minow, 2010).
While the situation has improved post SarbaneseOxley, a large
number of S&P 500, Mid-Cap 400 and Small-Cap 600 companies
were linked to at least one other board member in the group
(Monks & Minow, 2010: 260).
K.V. Kamath is the non-executive Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Infosys Limited and ICICI Bank.
He has a degree in mechanical engineering and did his
28 These refer to entities where the parent does not have majority
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contain competition to the disadvantage of the consumers.
The Clayton Act of 1914 in the US prohibited interlocking
directorates among competing corporations, but not
otherwise. Outside the US, Japanese Keiretsu firms in
particular make extensive use of director or board inter-
locks to co-ordinate member firm activities. These director
interlocks take the form of Presidents’ Council or Shacho-
kai memberships.26 Additional examples include the use of
director interlocks in French business groups such as
Groupe Paribas, Generale des Eaux and UAP among others
(Windolf, 2002). Director interlocks can either be direct or
indirect in nature. A direct interlock exists when there is
a single path between two organisations. An indirect
interlock exists when two organisations are linked by one or
more third organisation/s (Pennings, 1980). In addition to
their nature, the features which assume importance are
interlocking intensity, directionality, and strength.
Interlocking boards of directors is a predominant feature
of the Indian corporate sector. Using a sample of top
hundred companies on the National Stock Exchange of India
during 2000e2010, Balasubramanian, Barua, Bhagavatula,
and George (2011: 32) found a small group of highly boar-
ded directors (occupying five or more director positions)
constituting about 6% of the total number of NSE 100
company directors during this period and controlled some
66% of the total market capitalisation of all NSE listed
companies as of 2010. As elsewhere in the world, this
significant concentration of power in the hands of a small
corporate elite (which has increased over the decade from
33 to 43% in 2001e2003 to 66% in 2010), would appear to be
a matter for substantive public policy concern. And yet, it is
noteworthy that the comprehensive legislation on compe-
tition law in India is yet to address the issue of board
interlocks as a potential threat to fair competition.
Executive compensation
Indian legislation has been fairly stringent inmatters relating
to executive compensation. Directors’ remuneration has to
be approved by shareholders in general meeting and to fall
within prescribed statutory limits, although in recent years,
these limits have been significantly relaxed. However, in
practice, whatever the boards decide and propose typically
tends to receive shareholder approvals without much
discussion. Compensation committees are not yetmandatory
for listed companies.27 The legal requirement of an explan-
atory note for such resolutions is generally complied with,
with little discussion or dissemination of information to
shareholders on how the proposed compensation package
had been arrived at. Compounding this situation, controlling
shareholders can and do vote on their own compensation
resolutions. In a study on executive compensation in India,
Ramaswamy, Veliyath, and Gomes (2000) report that CEO26 See Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian (1996).
27 Companies listed on overseas stock exchanges will however have
such Compensation Committees to comply with applicable
regulations.compensation is positively related to CEO age and firm
performance. Interestingly, the study also reported that CEO
duality and the proportion of inside directors do not influence
CEO compensation in family firms but they do influence CEO
compensation in non-family firms.
Parentesubsidiary relationships
In case of group companies, boards and directors of
subsidiaries and affiliates are often confronted with issues
relating to their companies’ welfare and their own duties to
the minority or absentee shareholders if they are not wholly
owned by the parent. What is the role of the boards and
directors of the subsidiary/affiliate? Boards of locally
incorporated subsidiaries and controlled affiliates28 (SCA)
of domestic or multinational corporations have their own
oversight responsibilities for the actions of their compa-
nies. The boards of such companies are supreme as far as
their companies are concerned. At the same time, the SCA
also functions as part of the overall strategic objectives of
the parent company, and may have to fall in line with its
reporting and policy requirements. Directors nominated by
the parent company, while sitting on the SCA boards, have
to act in the best interests of the SCA. Courts have ruled
that otherwise they may be held to have failed in their
duties of fiduciary accountability to their corporations and
their shareholders, even if the decisions were in the larger
interests of the group. Judicial pronouncements have also
upheld equitable treatment of minority shareholders in
subsidiary companies.29 Most often the interests of
subsidiaries and their affiliates may coincide with the
parents’ but where they do not, their boards and directors
have a duty to act in the best interest of their companies
and (especially) their minority shareholders.30
C. In conversation with K.V. Kamath,
Chairman, Infosys and ICICI Bankcontrol but has by separate shareholders’ agreements (written into
the companies’ Articles of Association) or otherwise has control
over board decisions and or management control of operations.
29 More detailed discussions including case law citations, are
available in Hadden (2002); see Ramsay, Ian and Geof Stapledon
(1998) for cases from Australia.
30 A discussion of such selected cases of conflict is available in
Balasubramanian (2010: 297e300).
management studies at the Indian Institute of
Management Ahmedabad.
K.V. Kamath started his career in 1971 at ICICI and in
1988, he moved to the Asian Development Bank and
spent several years in South East Asia before returning
to ICICI as its Managing Director and CEO in 1996. He
retired as the Managing Director and CEO in April 2009,
and took up his present position as the non-executive
Chairman. K.V. Kamath joined the Board of Infosys in
May 2009 and took over as Chairman of the Board in
August 2011.
K.V. Kamath was conferred the Padma Bhushan, one of
India’s highest civilian honors, in 2008. He has
received widespread recognition internationally and in
India, including being named Businessman of the Year
by Forbes Asia and Business Leader of the Year by The
Economic Times, India, in 2007. K.V. Kamath was the
President of the Confederation of Indian Industry from
2008 to 2009. He has been a co-chair of the World
Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos.
Source: www.infosys.com.
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N. Balasubramanian (NB): On behalf of IIMB Manage-
ment Review thank you Mr Kamath for sparing the time
to speak to us on this important subject. Before we get
down to specifics, would you like to share your overview
on the state of corporate governance in India?
K.V. Kamath (KVK): The area of corporate governance
really came into focus in the mid 1990s, when we started
discussing what a governance framework should look like
and referencing the Cadbury Committee and its recom-
mendations. Thereafter, some companies in India
voluntarily started putting this in place and other
companies started acting later on, as regulators and
industry bodies spelt out what was expected. Some
pioneers such as Infosys and ICICI Bank set up structures
in the 1990s, well before mandatory regulations came
into effect. Over the years most companies have
complied with or are complying with these norms. Along
the way, there have been several learnings and they will
have to be internalised as we go forward to see what is
next in the evolution of the governance area. It has been
15 years on the learning curve, and there is still a lot
more to be done. However, I do see an improving trend.
NB: Both India and China are being identified as power
houses of the near future. If India were to attract
investment both internally and overseas, one of the key
comfort factors is going to be how transparently and how
well the companies are governed here. From a reputa-
tion point of view, if we take forward steps in gover-
nance, it will probably be much better for the industry.
KVK: That is right, and one could also look at it from
a slightly different context. Companies need to under-
stand how governance is good for them and only then
will they adopt it. I recall a small story which Prof C.K.
Prahalad once shared, back in around 1996. He said that
traditionally businessmen did not separate the personal
from the company. It was expected that private benefitswould be sought by sponsors and the balance would be
left behind as profit in the company. But, as markets
evolved, sponsors understood better the tradeoff
between private transfers and allowing all the profit to
accrue to the company which would reflect in a higher
valuation of the company as a whole. So over a period of
time, when companies and sponsors understand this,
they move significantly along the course of governance.
Till then it will be followed only as a mandate.Independent directors
Rejie George (RG): I would like to have your thought on
the following two issues: (a) Why is there a fundamental
difficulty in getting good independent directors? (b)
Despite the great strides that women have been making
in the corporate world in recent years, we still have
a paucity of women independent directors.
KVK: In selecting the slate of independent directors, the
nominations committee or the governance committee has
to followa process. The process should beginwithmapping
the skills required on the board, depending on the size of
the company and the complexity of its situation then the
company shouldmap thebackground it needs inaperson to
be an independent director. Do you need a person with
experience in a particular industry or inmultiple industries
but in the same function? Many combinations are possible.
The next step is to prepare a slate of people with the
required skills. Companies, at some stage, run into a chal-
lenge infinding the rightnames tomatch the skills that they
require. It is not that there is a dearth of people who could
hold independent director positions. Given the complex-
ities, the challenge comes in when you look at the
requirement and then try to map who could fit.
Once you prepare a slate of who could fit the require-
ment, you need to make sure that they are available.
Given the structure of board meetings, with boards that
meet over two days or three days, it would be difficult
for a person to be associated with more than three
boards. The board has to juggle the calendar of several
people and most boards these days set the calendar in
advance. Once the board narrows down on somebody
who could fit the required profile, then comes the
challenge of making sure that dates match, and so on. So
the process of selecting a person then forms an admin-
istrative challenge. There are several things which
actually impact the process of getting people on the
board. That is why it is not as straightforward as it looks.
If you do a rigorous job, all these requirements need to
be in place and you must ensure that every board
member is able to attend every board meeting when it is
called and provide time as required between board
meetings. There would be many people with qualifica-
tions but how to get what you need is a challenge.
Coming to the question of women in leadership posi-
tions, in India we are at a very early stage of throwing up
a big slate of women leaders. That will gather pace now,
as the number of women who have graduated from
business schools and with other professional degrees
increases. However, in India, although business schools
Gender diversity
The poor board level representation of women has
recently come up for comment and criticism and there
has been support for larger representation for women
on company boards. The June 2003 Tyson Report on
non-executive directors commissioned by the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, UK advocated larger
representation for women on company boards in the
UK (Tyson, 2003). This support is based not so much on
the gender-agenda but more on the kind of skills and
experience from the non-commercial sector and the
relatively soft fields that women would bring. Tyson
quotes Cadbury in her report to support induction of
more women on to corporate boards.33
In India, the Companies Bill, 2011 mandates that
a company in the categories to be notified by the
government shall have at least one woman director.34
The statistics on board memberships occupied by
women in corporate India as of 31st March 2011 show
that of the 718 board posit ions in the Nifty
companies, women occupied just 32 or 4.5% of the
board seats (Balasubramanian & Anand, 2012).
Fourteen of these 32 seats were taken by non-
independent non-executive members likely signifying
promoter-and-family-related appointments.
Tyson’s and the Cadbury Report’s observations apply
even more strongly to emerging economies like India,
as businesses have to face the twin challenges of
operating profitably in a more competitive interna-
tional environment and ordering their activities so that
they are fully in accord with the more demanding
societal expectations. Further, the induction of
women would provide a larger pool of potential
directorial talent, the supply of which is inadequate at
present, and it would ensure that “the make-up of
boards would come closer to that of society as
a whole” Cadbury (2002: 67).
There are other avenues to augment board diversity as
well, many of them being country specific. These
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a long time, a truly professional approach started only
after the mid 1990s. Only then did companies start
having a formal process of identifying merit and talent,
putting people on the growth path and so on. Our
experience is very short and the women leaders who
have emerged are today represented on boards in ample
measure. But it will take time for this slate to become
bigger. Globally, the situation is only slightly better. I do
not think biases are an issue. There is today genuine
willingness to go beyond just the male gender. But we
are facing a challenge in terms of identifying, starting
the process, spelling out requirements and skill sets and
then mapping on a gender neutral basis, the best
candidates to meet the requirements.
NB: A recent report31 finds women representation on
boards in the US and many other industrialised countries
having gone up substantially, by some 30 or 40 basis
points, but the progress in emerging economies including
India remains weak. There is also a research finding32
that a minimum of three women on boards constitutes
a critical mass for them to be effective in shaping board
policies and for their leadership styles to gain
acceptance.
KVK: On the basis of the boards that I have seen where
there have been women, I would question that finding.
Irrespective of the gender, if the person is selected after
the due process (as described) and brings to the role the
required maturity and experience, she/he is able to
contribute.
RG: I believe that in some of the Scandinavian countries,
they actually mandate a certain quantum of represen-
tation of women. Would you subscribe to that?
KVK: I don’t subscribe to mandating gender at all. That
is a wholly wrong way of doing things. If you look at the
experience of ICICI, many people have asked me how we
got this great slate of women leaders. I have only one
answer. Running a non-discriminatory gender process
and equally important, running a merit based process.
Merit from the time of recruitment, through the process
and making sure that no job is held back from women
because you feel that they can’t do it. If you have such
an environment, women will rise. That is what we should
address. Addressing the matter with a mandated quota is
extremely short sighted in its solution. Moreover,
mandating it by law is an extreme step. Companies
ought to look at it as something that is truly value
additive, and make that extra effort to identify the slate
of women and then let meritocracy take its course e the
challenge here is that they may not be able to identify
the women leaders immediately.31 GMI Ratings’ 2012 Women on Boards Survey (2012), Kimberley
Gladman, at http://www.gmiratings.com (accessed on 23/09/
2012).
32 Critical mass: The Impact of Three or More Women on Corporate
Boards, (2008), Konrad, A.M., Kramer, V.W., and Erkut, S, Organi-
zational Dynamics, Volume 37, Issue 2 (AprileJune), 145e164.But having said that, if law makers find that it’s a stub-
born world out there and things do not happen on their
own, then they may have no option but to assign quotas.
I am not for quotas because I am clearly for having
women on the slate as an active board process as they
bring in a lot of diversity and multiple dimensions.include representation of ethnic and religious minori-
ties, economically backward communities, civil
society organisations, specialists, experts from host
countries, and other geographies and cultures. In
33 Cadbury (2002), cited in the Tyson Report (p. 61).
34 Proviso to Clause 149 of the Bill.
a country of sub-continental dimensions and diversity
such as India, boards may consider a broad based
induction from different parts of the country as
a demonstrable measure of their national stature. An
important point to remember is that functionality and
utility are crucial to board diversification exercises.
Beyond specific expertise, board members should be
able to contribute to the collective wisdom of the
board, which would enable it to feel the pulse of the
markets and the range of stakeholders it works with or
impacts. People with diverse backgrounds provide an
opportunity for such an ideal platform. As Cadbury
recalls, “it was argued in the US that a reason for
boards failing in their duty to their companies was that
their directors had too much in common with each
other, and were not therefore sufficiently critical in
their judgment of performance” Cadbury (2002: 67).
35 Coping with Corporate Cholesterol: Board Interlocks and Their
Impact on Corporate Governance: The Indian Experience (2011)
Balasubramanian N., Barua S., Bhagvatula S., George R. IIMB
Working Paper Series and SSRN Working Paper. Available at http://
www.iimb.ernet.in/research/working-papers/coping-corporate-
cholesterol-board-interlocks-and-their-impact-corporate-
governance-i.
224 N. Balasubramanian, R. GeorgeNB: That takes us to the next related issue. By and large,
independent directors appointed to boards generally
come from upper middle age to lower senior age. Maybe
that’s the time it takes to gain the maturity that you are
referring to. But in management you would put people in
positions a little ahead of time if necessary, to catch
them young and train them. Do you think there is merit
in taking younger people on the board on this basis?
Is it a good thing for board chairs and the senior
members to mentor and anchor? I know all board
members are equal but at the end of the day, people do
look up to role models, seniors and so on.
KVK: We have two questions here which could be
considered as a continuum. One is, what could a younger
slate bring in terms of value and the other is, what’s the
role of mentoring? Several companies have tried to get
a younger and younger slate. It is more difficult to get an
independent director slate which is young than an
internal slate which is young. That is my experience
across the several companies where I have served. The
reason is very simple. If it is a rigorous process and you
have a global board, you are talking of a commitment of
more or less a week to a board every quarter. I presume
that somebody who is young, not yet 60, would most
likely be working, and that sort of commitment is very
difficult if you are working actively. For that sort of
a commitment to be made, the company where the
person is working has to be really forward thinking and
understand that if one of our executives is going out and
working as a non-executive director, it is hugely value
additive to our company, not because she/he sees what
the other company is doing but she/he learns board
processes, and gets wiser by talking to other people on
the board. But boards are finding that getting people
below 60 is a challenge. I don’t see that challenge
reducing going forward. Companies will have to look at
somebody who is towards the end of active hands-on
CEO or senior positions but otherwise is very agile
mentally.
Coming to the second question, mentoring and training
of an independent director at a board level doesn’t
happen and I am not very sure whether that is needed.What does happen is that a new member on a particular
board quickly picks up processes and perspectives and
there is always cross-fertilisation. If members share
processes that are good in terms of governance, best
practices, and so on as far as conduct of the board is
concerned, it adds to the process of enrichment of the
entire board and not any individual member. Mentoring
could and certainly does happen in the context of the
executive slate. The CEO and the executives on the
board may be given the role of mentoring the next
leadership slate in the company. That happens but not at
independent director level.
NB: Do training programmes help? We have a bit of
experience at IIM Bangalore. We probably were the first
centre there to offer training programmes or orientation
programmes for directors. It is usually a 3 day pro-
gramme and a number of people have attended it over
several years. Do you think there is a value in doing more
of those?
KVK: Absolutely. Orientation is a must. If a company is
capable of doing it, they should do it. If they are not
capable of doing it, I see enormous merit in somebody
from outside doing it. But that has pluses and minuses. In
terms of broad process and best practice, a leading
institute like IIM Bangalore doing it has lot of merit
because you bring knowledge that is relevant and
current to the table. But where there could be weakness
is in the company specific knowledge which is critical
and that briefing doesn’t happen in most companies. In
the companies of which I am on the board, there is
a process for new director orientation and it is between
half a day to a day. In one of the overseas companies,
the company actually sends down somebody to take you
through the various aspects of the company and its
practices and processes so that when you attend the
meeting, you are up to speed. There is an enormous
value in doing that.
Director interlocks
RG: Our next set of questions pertains to interlocking of
boards and directors. To give you the context, sometime
back, Prof Balasubramanian, myself and other
colleagues, studied NSE 100 companies, to ascertain the
extent of multiple directorships which were being held
by the directors.35 What we found is a noticeable up
trend in terms of the extent of multiple directorships
which are being held. So, in the limited sample of these
NSE 100 companies, it went up from 26% of the directors
having multiple directorship positions in 2001 to 36% or
37% when we looked at the 2010 data. One of the
Director Interlocks
Director interlocks have been historically charac-
terised by a dual perspective.
But despite their potential problems, board interlocks
appear to be quite common inmost parts of theworld. In
the US, Davis and colleagues studied three sample sets of
companies and directors, using the “small world” anal-
ysis methodology37 and concluded that “[C]orporate
America is overseen by a network of individuals who to
a great extent know each other or have acquaintances
36 See footnote 35.
37 See The Small World Problem, Psychology Today, 2: pp. 60e67.
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pursuit of having these “good independent directors” we
were unwittingly taxing some of them by making them
party to a host of boards and making unreasonable
demands on their time?
KVK: I think it’s a very relevant question and your
analysis is very relevant. Possibly it also has to be done
through a different prism. The percentage of people who
are on multiple boards is increasing. From a board point
of view, I would look at the number of board positions
that a director is holding as the most critical thing.
I believe that if you are on more than three boards today
you have a challenge on hand. If all those boards are
doing what is expected of boards today, that is if the
committee meetings take the time scheduled, and the
committee outcomes are delivered to the board, this
would take a minimum of two days. If you are not doing
this over two days, and meeting just for a few hours, you
would find it difficult to do justice to the role of the
committee or the board.
I would look at the number of boards and the increase in
common names across boards as the most significant. I
would be extremely conscious of looking at how many
board positions someone has so that we understand that
the person has enough time to devote to the board.
Historically this was not a focus area in India but going
forward it is becoming important. In my own case I have
decided that at this point of time, three boards is the
maximum that I could be on.
NB: In fact the point you made about three boards is so
relevant. Some years ago in the US, Arthur Levitt the
then SEC chair, set out to find how much time it took for
a good director representatively in a large US company
to adequately discharge his or her board responsibilities.
He came out with some 23 or 24 working days in a year,
necessary for each company and that’s practically
a calendar month. So, your estimate of three or four
boards is a good indicator. Of course it also depends
upon what else one is doing: if one is a whole time
director or a managing director somewhere or a full time
professional in great demand, these equations will
change...
KVK: Then even three would be too difficult. If you are
working full time elsewhere, even one other boardmaybe
difficult. If you are otherwise free, I think you could
possibly do three. Again, the functioning of the board is
undergoing a subtle change which I have not seen written
of in the literature. Today a large part of the board
dynamics happens in the committees because that’s
where you have the required time. An audit committee
could meet for a whole day, and could meet mid-term.
Usually there is a conference call prior to the audit
committee meeting so you would have spent an hour or
two hours on a call and then two or three hours ormore on
the actual committee discussion, then a briefing to the
board of the essence of the discussion that you had in
every committee. So, today the briefing of the board by
committee chairs, the minutes of those meetings, these
are the bedrock of governance. Because you cannot
expect a board to discuss in three hours all the things in
the governance context that I believe you ought to
discuss. You need the board committee processes to bringit to a level which then becomes the foundation for rele-
vant discussions at the full board. It helps that others have
applied deep thought to the topics and the board gets
briefed on the essence of the topics which then can be
meaningfully and manageably discussed.
RG: It’s very interesting that you should mention that,
Mr. Kamath, because one of the things which puzzled
us when we were doing a statistical analysis, trying to
examine the extent of interlocking and looking at
a firm performance measure like Return on Assets
(ROA) or a hybrid measure such as the Q ratio, we
found that having more number of board positions was
not having a negative effect on their performance.36
In fact, the extent of interlocking had a positive
effect on ROA.
KVK: By the same yardstick, I can ask a wider question.
Have companies which have adopted what you think is
good governance e do they have extraordinary perfor-
mance? May be or may be not. It is still very early in the
cycle. You need to see this over a much longer period of
time to understand how companies have weathered
shocks. It could be a benign cycle that an industry is
riding on. Maybe it is a time when prices have just shot
through the roof and you are just sitting back and
reaping the rewards. So, whether you do anything or
not, your profits are going to be high. Similarly whatever
you do in the banking business globally today, however
well “governed” you are, you are not going to do so well
in the minds of investors. We have to look at it over
a much longer period of time.
RG:We haven’t accounted for many of the nuances you
mentioned earlier. In the interlock index we calculated
for the study, we just calculated the number of multiple
directorships a director held; we did not look at the
complexity associated with the differences among the
companies on which the directors were serving on board
or factor in the extent of committee level responsibili-
ties that these directors were entrusted with.
in common. (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003: 321e22). In
continental Europe the interlock scenario is even more
striking (Kogut & Belinky 2008, pp. 1e10, Table 1 & 2).
In the UK, the path length was about 5.6 in case of 2236
publicly traded companies in 2003 (Conyon & Muldoon
2006, pp. 1321e43, Table 2).38 In Canada, a group of 16
directors, constituting less than 1% of the total 1689
directors sitting on boards comprising the S&P/TSX
Composite Index, sit on 31% of all Index companies,
representing the market capitalisation of around 51% of
the Index companies (Rowley & Fullbrook, 2004). They,
however, find that this elite group has transferred good
practices from within their companies to each other.
In India, interlocking is fairlywidespread. A studyonNSE
100 companies from 2001 to 2010, (Balasubramanian,
Barua, Bhagvatula, & George, 2011) found that while
the total number of directors in the NSE 100
companies increased from 888 to 1104, the total
number of director positions increased from 1415 to
2037 leading to a further increase in overboarded
directors and interlocked boards. Thus, the total
number of multiple directors went up from 242 to 414
and the proportion of multiple directorships has
increased from 27% to 38%. Corporate legislation in
India prescribes a ceiling of 15 companies of which an
individual could be a director. In practice, due to
several permitted exclusions, this number can be
significantly exceeded.39 The Confederation of Indian
Industry’s 1998 (non-binding) Desirable Code had
suggested a ceiling of 10 listed companies.
Although multiple directorships is a topic that attracts
popular attention leading to calls for mandated ceil-
ings, the gravity of the issue is limited only to a small
proportion of directors internationally and in India. In
India while the numbers of overboarded directors may
not be alarmingly large, the cumulative market capi-
talisation of the companies they are connected with
may be amaterial factor: in 2001 and 2010 respectively,
these directors controlled 43% and 66% of the NSE 100
capitalisation; from the viewpoints of competition and
societal impact, these are not numbers that can be
dismissed lightly. Interestingly, the study also found
evidence that while director concentration with
respect to market capitalisation was worrisome, higher
director interlocking was found to be positively related
to accounting measures of firm performance such as
ROA and ROE, reflecting the inherent duality in the
implications of director interlocks.
For an interesting insight into the nature of the ties
between d i rector s , see Chandrasekhar and
Muralidharan (2012).
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39 See Section 275 of the Companies Act, 1956, as amended up to
30 June 2006, and Section 278.KVK: That’s why I go back to the first question, the role of
independent directors. If you ask me, in a three hour
meeting where everything is just ready for you, you nod
and you sign and get out of themeeting. Is there a role for
the independent director if it is restricted to that? You
have to go through the process that I detailed earlier and
then look atwhether, collectively,we are bringing to bear
what we are expected to bring to bear over a period of
time for eachmeeting, apart from the reading? Reading is
one part of it and then is the deliberation.
NB: Interlocking directors are generally referred to in
the literature as elite directors. People get inducted on
to the boards because they bring some resources with
them. What do such elite directors bring to the table?
What do you look at other than the professional
resources that they bring? In a country like India, do we
also consider their networking capabilities and so on?
KVK: In the historical context in India with licensing as
a key issue there could have been some benefits. But
during that period of time, the sponsor had all the
contacts and connections, and the board was not open
at all. So, he held the keys and he managed on his own.
So even historically it didn’t bring much value.
Nowadays, I don’t think this is put as a top priority. If it is
there, it is incidental and it could at best help you to get an
initial introduction. Beyond that, everything is at arm’s
length. What is looked at is e apart from what you do in
your specialist function or overall functionewhat do you
bring in terms of knowledge in a particular context? For
example, a global board would want geographic knowl-
edge. Do you bring that geographic knowledge? Do you
have an intimate understanding of what’s happening in
the domainwhich is relevant to the company? These could
be over-riding things that you look for in a set of directors.
Purely their ability to connect andprovidea relationship is
not paramount at all. The old boys’ network sort of situ-
ation is getting dissipated very quickly.
NB: Some directors seem to be sitting on boards of
companies which are competing in material lines of
business. What is your view on this?
KVK: Clearly, there is a conflict of interest. Most good
boards have it very clearly laid down as to what is
a conflict. Before you join a board that is understood.
Before you join another board you need to get a clear-
ance from the boards you are sitting on and some boards
require it in writing.
NB: Because at the end of the day, you are fiduciarily
responsible to different sets of shareholders and it may
not always be a win-win for both sets of the shareholders.
KVK: That is correct.
NB: How do we make the institution of independent
directors more effective? I have been referring to invited
independence and imposed independence. Invited inde-
pendence is where the company is convinced that having
those outside people adds value. Imposed independence
is for check box compliance. My experience is that invited
independence contributes and imposed independence
does not. Since we seem to have accepted that the insti-
tutionof independentdirectors is necessary in thepresent
governance context, are there any thoughts on how we
could strengthen that institution, how do we enable that
institution? Right now, independent directors are there
Possible solution
On specified key matters, such decisions must have the
affirmative support of a majority of the full comple-
ment of independent directors on the board (and not
just of those present at the meeting).
Problem 3
Where the promoters or controlling shareholders have
a substantial equity holding, independent directors
often are discouraged from exercising their judgement
since they feel that at members’ general meetings,
the resolutions would be approved anyway by virtue of
the voting equations. This impairs the potential of the
independent directors to protect the interests of the
minority/absentee shareholders even in matters
involving related party actions.
Possible solution
Mandate through legislation or regulation that inter-
ested shareholders should be restrained from exer-
cising their vote on resolutions where they or their
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heard. There are two specific reforms which one has been
talking about for some time. One is to say that having got
the independent directors on your board, you make sure
that for the board meeting to be duly constituted,
a majority of the independent directors ought to be
present. At least we make sure that having got them on
board you don’t get only the non-independent directors
sitting and passing important resolutions.
The second proposal is on certain specified key issues
affecting the company including related party trans-
actions. At the board, these should be taken as approved
only if affirmatively approved by a majority, including
a majority of the independent directors on the board.
Say there are six independent directors then at least
three should be voting for them. These are the two
things which I have been pressing for some time.Enablers of effective board independence
Board independence has been accepted as a major
instrument of protection of absentee (or minority)
shareholders’ interests. Yet, the general perception is
that the institution of independent directors has not
delivered up to its promise. The principal problems
militating against exercise of effective board inde-
pendence and their possible solution are summarised
as follows: (Balasubramanian, 2009: 554e575).
Problem 1
Board meetings could be validly constituted without
any of the independent directors being present, if the
required quorum is met by the presence of executive
and non-independent non-executive directors. Reso-
lutions impacting the interests of minority or absentee
shareholders could thus be approved without the
independent segment of the board having a say.
Possible solution
To constitute a due quorum for such meetings, one, or
a majority of all the independent directors, or such
proport ion of independent directors to non-
independent directors should be present that bears
the same proportion on the full board,40 whichever of
the three options is the highest.
Problem 2
Since it may not always be possible for all independent
directors to be present at every meeting, a truncated
board may well have to approve major decisions
impacting the company and its shareholders.
nominees stand to benefit. All RPTs including mergers
or demergers of group entities, executive compensa-
tion, preferential equity offers, and such other issues
will be covered under this reform, leaving the
absentee/minority shareholders who are negatively
impacted to take a call on such matters. This will also
require institutional shareholders to apply their mind
to the justifiability of such actions and vote in favour
or against; they would also be required to publicise
their decisions on key resolutions in advance for the
benefit of other shareholders.
The Irani Committee (MCA, 2005, para 35) formally
recogni sed that the concept of “ interested
shareholders” not voting on matters where they
stand to benefit was “an area of good corporate
governance,” but stopped short of recommending
legislation. In 2011, SEBI recommended to the
government incorporating necessary provisions in the
Companies Bill pending before parliament but the
final outcome is awaited. When accepted and
implemented, this would mark a significant milestone
in the history of corporate governance development
in India.
40 For example, if a board has a 1:1 ratio of independent directors
to other directors, then the proposed quorum requirement would
be 1:1 of the directors present; if three non-independent directors
are present, then three independent directors will have to be
present to meet quorum requirements.KVK: Coming to the larger issue that you mentioned, of
invited and imposed independence, it will evolve. People
will understand that inviting and broad basing advice and
the governance structure is value additive. The other
challenge in this is to see what the ownership pattern is
and how the company is actually controlled. As you move
to a situation where companies are professionally
managed irrespective of the ownership structure, with
the CEO also being an independent professional, struc-
tureswill evolve. As long as you have companies which are
controlled by individual groups, there you could see the
challenge of imposed vis a vis invited independent
directors. But it has to move towards the other extreme.
When moving to the other extreme which is invited
independent directors, you have seen learnings happen;
in the first flush, the chairman who was the CEO had such
influence on the board (because he had crafted the board
Related party transactions
Related party transactions (RTPs) are defined as “a
transfer of resources or obligations between related
parties, regardless of whether or not a price is
charged,” with related party meaning those with the
228 N. Balasubramanian, R. Georgehimself) that the board acted as he wanted. That is
changing very rapidly, because of oversight by regulators
and oversight by investors.
NB: On enabling of the institution of independent direc-
tors and protecting absentee shareholders, I just want to
raise one more question. There is a proposal that some
issues concerning related party transactions and so on
which could go to the generalmeeting ofmembers; in that
general bodymeeting, interested shareholders should not
be allowed to vote. They should only beallowed to explain
how the proposals were good for the company and the
other shareholders. To support this, there is an OECD
governance code which says that negatively impacted
shareholders should be the oneswho should be supporting
things like this. We are of course not part of OECD but we
have accepted OECD principles as standard guidelines.
Would you like to comment?
KVK: I think we need to understand the complexity. How
do we put matters to the general body? Otherwise you
will have a situation where every small matter may have
to go to the general body. To me then it is as if they are
running the company rather than executive manage-
ment. The Board has oversight and is responsible to the
shareholders. Today there are things that need to go to
shareholders for approval but I think we need to nuance
it even more to understand that something which is
clearly concerned with related parties and has material
impact on the company and its absentee shareholders
needs to go to shareholders.
NB: That’s the key. When you merge group companies,
when you diversify some businesses into one of your asso-
ciate companies, some of these things involve promoter
shareholders benefitting and others probably suffering.
KVK: I think there is a very strong case there. The merit
of such moves ought to be seen by a large majority of
shareholders.“ability to control the other party or exercise signifi-
cant influence over the other party in making financial
and/or operating decisions.”41
Related party transactions are a commonly used
mechanism for the controlling owners and manage-
ment to expropriate for themselves a higher than
proportionate share of the wealth created in the
company as well as in its wealth-creating assets. While
there is some research related to tunnelling among
business groups in India42 given the opaque nature of
the activity, hard evidence is difficult to come by
and most research efforts tend to document the
phenomenon indirectly.
Balasubramanian et al. (2010) indicate that 78% of the
responding firms in their survey had policies requiring
41 Paragraph 10 of the Accounting Standard AS 18 on Related Party
Disclosures (2000), in Compendium of Accounting Standards (2002),
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, New Delhi.
42 Bertrand et al. (2002) and Mazumdar (2008) report widespread
tunnelling, while Siegel and Choudhury (2010) report that these
could not be confirmed during 1989e2008.Family owned and controlled entities and
board issues
RG: I now want to turn your attention to the linkages
between family controlled and owned businesses and
potential board issues. How do you tackle the problems
pertaining to the potential lack of alignment between
majority shareholders’ and minority shareholders’ inter-
ests? And how would the board be able to protect the
minority shareholders from the extraction of “private
benefits of control” or benefits which may not accrue
proportionately to theminority shareholders? Also in your
experience what are the challenges associated with the
functioning of boards of companies in which the family
does not have substantial control vis a vis those boards
that are family owned or controlled enterprises?
KVK: Directors have to look at the company as an
independent entity in its own right and their fiduciary
responsibility in that context. So ultimately the board is
a fiduciary of all the shareholders and has to act in the
best interests of the company.
The issueof privatebenefits is verydifficult toaddress.How
are theyarising?Howdoyoumake sure that this is or is not in
the company’s interest? This is going to be a challenge aslong as you have shareholding which is controlled by a few.
You can tighten the regulation but you cannot do awaywith
that. There are so many ways in which private benefits
could be sought without the knowledge of the boards.
The best mitigant for that is the market process. I go
back to the C.K. Prahalad example that I gave in the
beginning. You are asking me the same question basi-
cally. But if I look at it from 1996 to today, there has
been a sea change. The sponsor today understands the
value of not seeking private benefit. In fact, if the
sponsor seeks private benefits, then not only is there an
opportunity loss in terms of wealth creation, but the
market would actually punish businesses and sponsors
where such private benefit transfers take place. When
sponsors have taken the right path, have grown their
companies, have looked at opportunities e and this has
happened particularly in the last three to four years, it
has not happened in the past 15 or even 25 years e they
are pledging their shares and raising money. And see the
punishment that is meted out to a company where the
principal shareholder has been asked for a top-up of the
shares pledged, just a top-up. You may have aspirations
and do several things but you will quickly learn that the
market will react, and that you have to learn to operate
within its bounds. So, in addition to the board gover-
nance processes, the structure put in by clause 49 and by
various committees, the market exercises control, and
rewards and punishes behaviour.
RPTs to be on arms-length terms. Clause 49 of the
Listing Agreement between stock exchanges and listed
companies in India requires the audit committee to
approve all RPTs and requires the firm to disclose
“materially significant” RPTs to shareholders. Ninety-
four percent of firms said they reported RPTs. to
shareholders, but this included some firms which re-
ported having no or negligible RPTs, and thus nothing
to disclose. When asked to quantify RPTs as
a percentage of sales, 67% (20%) of firms with RPTs
reported that RPTs were at least 1% (5%) of revenue.
In a later study covering data of 4517 unique firms
from 22 countries across Europe and Asia, Gopalan and
Jayraman (2012) confirm tunnelling activities in insider
controlled43 corporations and report that such
companies operating in low investor protection
countries are associated with more earnings
management than their non-insider controlled coun-
terparts and that the extent of earnings management
within insider controlled firms was increasing in the
extent of divergence between cash flow rights and
control rights. In a related vein, George and Kabir
(2008) report evidence of profit redistribution among
firms affiliated to Indian Business Groups.
The issue therefore is not whether such tunnelling
potential exists or not but to what extent and with
what degree of success it is exploited, and how it
could be contained. Very few tunnelling cases get
exposed in India and further, their resolution is
delayed or denied (as apparently seems to have
happened in the infamous Satyam Computers case).44
Legislation and regulation, when skillfully drafted and
rigorously enforced; transparency and disclosure
accompanied by timely and purposeful regulatory
surveillance are a likely remedy to tunnelling. Indian
law does call for disclosure to the board and absten-
tion from voting by interested directors in case of
RTPs, but to be effective, boards and their indepen-
dent directors should have the ability and willingness
to critically explore such disclosures and ensure that
such transactions when approved would not adversely
impact their companies’ and their absentee share-
holders’ interests.
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that as you have a more active market for corporate
control, it would address these concerns to some
extent?
KVK: I would say the ability to game the system is
counter-balanced by the ability of the system to game43 The authors classify firms as insider controlled if they belong to
a family group as per Claessens et al. (2000) or they belong to
a business group as per Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001).
44 For a case history see Balasubramanian (2011: 4.1e4.36).you. It would punish you by punishing your stock in
a dramatic fashion. Your stock drops like a stone and
when it has dropped like that, people very quickly learn
that that’s not the fate that they want. This punishment
in significant measure happened in 2011e2012, which
was the year in which the market turned.
RG: As a follow-up question, there is some literature
which is looking at the substitution effects taking place
between some of the governance mechanisms.45 For
instance, as per the Clause 49 listing agreements, if you
have both the Chairperson as well as the Chief Executive
Officer position combined, then you will have to have
half of the board to be independent, whereas if you
were to have two different individuals, you can get by
with one-third of the board being independent. Are
there any conscious choices being exercised when you
choose between these alternatives?
KVK: These are what I would call transition arrange-
ments. The principal issue is whether there is any merit
in separating the positions? Based on my experience, I
believe separating out the positions has merit. I put that
in the context of being, probably, one of the first CEOs in
the country who was not a Chairman as well. So I have
first-hand experience of the process from 1996 to 2009.
And having gone through the process, I see enormous
merit in keeping the board process separate from
executive processes. Once the system understands that
that is the best way for the structure to work, you will
find this happening.Board processes and committees
RG: We have been interviewing independent directors in
an ongoing study to get a sense of some of the board
processes. Based on your experience, we would also like
to have your views on director peer evaluations. Where
are we in India on this subject?
KVK: I will give you the answer straightaway. We are at
a very early stage of the learning curve. Most boards
don’t do it. But professional boards do. But the learning
curve needs to get steeper whether it is peer or board
assessment itself. Feedback on the board and on indi-
vidual board members happens. On some boards it is
very rigorous and on some boards, it is more broad
brush. The real issue is how well the chair is able to take
all suggestions, whether they pertain to the board
process or individual performance, and then implement
them. That’s a very difficult task because boards
generally don’t ask people to go. But I am sure that also
is in an evolutionary stage. I think most of these norms
will be set from the West. In the West till recently you
had the Chair and the CEO as one position and the
companies did very well. The board was full of people
the Chair picked and they believed that the Chair could45 Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative
governance mechanisms (1995) Rediker K, Seth A. Strategic
Management Journal 16: 85e99.
46 The India Way: How India’s Top Leaders are Revolutionising
Management (2010), Capelli P., Singh H., Singh J, Useem M., Har-
vard Business School Publishing.
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coming full circle now.
RG: In the context of family owned and managed enti-
ties when something like CEO compensation is discussed,
how much of a leeway does the compensation
committee have?
KVK: There are a lot of improvements happening in
family companies as far as professional compensation is
concerned. The entrepreneur now understands that
professionals ought to be compensated, otherwise you
may not get the talent and that it is in the company’s
good. That is what is driving it, not anything else. Even in
medium sized companies, the compensation package
now at CEO level is fairly robust. It is no longer the case
of the sponsor getting more. But having said that, in
some companies you find the commission structure to
a dominant shareholder, who may not be a majority
shareholder, is completely out of sync with the CEO’s
pay. This is getting corrected but historically, over 10
years, if you take groups and you look at the commis-
sions, you will find the CEO pay completely out of
structure. Today the CEO pay has improved but
commissions are probably where they were. The
commission structure is peculiar to India, it is not there
in the West. This is something that we will need to
understand a little more.
NB: I think the associated question with this is
compensating correctly for the professionals who are in
that position. But are the dominant shareholders who
are in the CEO’s positions or in executive directorial
positions, being paid salaries and commissions at an
appropriate level, above appropriate level, or below
appropriate level? Does the compensation committee at
the board have any say in that matter?
KVK: What I find difficult is when somebody who is not in
an executive position gets a higher compensation in the
form of commission. This is a private benefit. In some of
these companies, the compensation to the independent
directors is lower than that to their promoter. Companies
need to have a process, look at the value add and then
take a decision. However, all these processes are in the
evolutionary stage. The fact that a professional CEO is
getting paid what I think is market, is a big positive. Just
a while ago, I would not have been able to say this.
RG: In relation to the independent directors’ pay, what
would be the so called “sweet spot”? On one hand, you
could have a situation in which sitting fees are very low
and not commensurate with the amount of effort and
expertise for people at that level of expertise. But on
the other hand, if it goes to the other end of the spec-
trum there could be a question about whether the
independent director is really independent.
KVK: That’s a very important question. What is appro-
priate compensation for an independent director? But I
don’t think we have answered that question as yet. It is in
evolution. In the West, they are trying to work out the
number of days an independent director, at his/her level
of skill set, will be required to spend on the job and assess
the compensation that the person would get for those
number of days. A very simple way to look at this is, how
muchwould the person in an executive position have been
commanding? And I can categorically say that by thatyardstick the compensation is just appropriate. It is
neither too high nor too low. In fact in most companies it
could be higher. Of course, the traditional mindset is that
shareholderswouldquestion this and say that independent
directors should not receive any significant compensation.
But below an appropriate compensation, people are not
willing to join boards. So the market has determined its
own rate and there is very little leeway that the board has.In conclusionNB: A couple of general questions. Infosys, for example,
has set some very high standards in governance for
a long time. At that time, they were at the top of the
pack and it made other IT companies emulate them. But
did you see that pressure going beyond the IT sector?
KVK: It has gonebeyond. I go back to that first questionwe
discussed substantially e gaming the system and private
benefit and what the checks and balances have been. The
same checks and balances have made it go beyond. If
people realise that there is value in this, theyarewilling to
go along quite some distance. For example, several
pharma companies have made the move and they are
predominantly family owned. There are several compa-
nies trying to move, not just in form, but in substance.
Very interestingly when I meet much smaller companies
that are often unlisted, if the company is an exceptional
leader, it will be of the same mind. Many of these
companies do not need to make the move but they are
doing it on their own because they see the merit of it.
NB: Coming back to regulation, in countries like the UK, you
have “comply or explain” regimes. The regulator prescribes
things and then leaves it to the company to follow. While
a certain basic minimum can be prescribed mandatorily,
a lot of other good things can be prescribed with this option
of comply or explain, and it could be left to the market to
decide whether to reward the company or to punish it. Do
youthink India ismovingtowards that,areweready for that?
KVK: No, we are not ready for that.
NB: Do you believe we should be focusing on mandating
that?
KVK: I think it will take us some time to get ready for it
because the process started only towards the mid to late
1990s. It is basically a ten-year old phenomenon in terms
of our coming out of our earlier mindset, opening up and
trying to understand the pros and cons of the new
situation.
RG: Recently, a group of professors from Wharton,
University of Pennsylvania wrote a book called “The
India Way: How India’s Top Leaders are Revolutionising
Management”.46 It discusses the recent successes of
Indian companies and whether the West or other
advanced economies can learn any lessons from that.
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to board governance?
KVK: No, not yet. We will have to see it as we evolve. A
very interesting thought but I leave it to others; top of
my mind e not yet. A large number of companies in India
are just getting on the learning curve to understand it
better. If you benchmark the best companies in India
with some of their global peers, they are not falling
short. But I can’t see as yet the India Way in board
governance.
NB: For example, say if we go back to the epics and the
precepts of Rajneeti, and what was laid down in the
Mahabharatha and the Arthashastra, we could say what
applied to kings and kingdoms in those days can apply
today. Modern corporations are kingdoms in their own
way. So we are familiar with many of those broad prin-
ciples of good governance, stakeholder governance,
social responsibility and things like that. So are we not
a little ahead of the rest?
KVK: I entirely agree that all that is there, but much of it
was forgotten in the way we led companies during
a large part of our post-independence period. But if you
look at our history and the old tenets and precepts,
there is a lot of literature on how to look at shades of
grey. And that’s probably the most relevant thing today.
That’s something that we could pick up and start flying
with as we go on.
NB: We posited India and China as potential power
houses earlier. Do you see India moving towards the
leadership position in global standards of corporate
governance in the near future? Can the rest of the world
look to India for some role modelling?
KVK: There will be certain companies which clearly
can be benchmarked with the world or we could say,
setting the best practice but if you look at the large
mass of Indian companies, the evolution will take
a longer time.
NB/RG: Thank you very much Mr. Kamath for your time.
It has been a wonderful experience talking to you and
gleaning from your vast experiential insights into this
important subject.
KVK: Thanks very much indeed.Acknowledgements
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